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Introduction
After thirty years’ effort, deregulation has been
achieved in key sectors of the U.S. economy—
the transportation, telecommunications, finan-
cial, and natural gas industries. Deregulation has
enhanced competition and efficiency and low-
ered prices in these industries. Moreover,
because so many other industries and house-
holds utilize these services, successful deregu-
lation also improves efficiency—and can
reduce prices—throughout the economy.
One current focus of deregulation is the
electric utility industry. Historically, regulated
regional monopolies have generated, trans-
mitted, and distributed electric power in the
United States. In recent years, several states
have acted to allow industrial, commercial,
and even residential consumers to choose
their power supplier, while many other states
are considering similar measures. In addition,
federal legislation has been proposed to help
clear further hurdles.
How will such legislation affect the prices 
of electricity and other goods as well as the
inflation rate? This paper uses two approaches
to that question: a microeconomic analysis
focused on existing electricity use and a
macroeconomic study of past episodes of
dramatic movement in energy prices.
I. Background
Every state in the Fourth Federal Reserve
District has either proposed or passed 
legislation to deregulate electricity production.
Ohio passed Senate Bill 3, which mandates
more consumer choice and the unbundling
of electricity services. This legislation will
allow consumers to choose their electric
power generator starting in 2001. It will
also oblige generators to compete for cus-
tomers on the basis of the price and reliability
of the power they can supply. Local distribu-
tion of electric power, however, will remain
a regulated monopoly, with distribution costs
tacked onto whatever power charge a particu-
lar customer can negotiate.1
  1 Distribution continues to be regulated because it is considered a
natural monopoly, given the redundancy of having more than one firm
maintain a system of power lines and poles in streets and neighborhoods
throughout each region.
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Generating facilities that become unprofitable
or less profitable when competition is introduced
are said to incur “stranded costs”; under Ohio’s
Senate Bill 3, these facilities are eligible for
partial compensation. They may raise the money
to cover some of their stranded costs by adding
a surcharge per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to
consumers’ bills. Rates will be capped at
current levels.
Ohio’s action and similar initiatives through-
out the region have been prompted by pro-
posed federal legislation that would require (or
at least strongly encourage) deregulation of
electric power generators. A number of bills to
increase competition in the industry have been
proposed by both parties in Congress and by
the Clinton administration.2 These bills mandate
(or strongly encourage) states to begin letting
consumers choose their electric power gener-
ators within the next few years, but leave
states to work out the specific details on issues
such as beginning dates and compensation of
stranded costs. The bills differ on whether they
mandate or support generation of energy from
renewable resources such as solar or wind
power and whether they provide assistance
to low-income consumers.
II. Deregulation 
and the Price of 
Electricity
As in most previous efforts in other industries,
deregulation is expected to lower the price of
electric power, partly because competition will
cause generators to price electricity according
to marginal costs (see Scott, Berger, and
Thompson [1997], Maloney and McCormick
[1996], and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration [1997]). Under the
current fair-rate-of-return system for setting
regulated electricity prices, utilities are granted
a fair rate of return to cover plant investment
and operating costs. This practice allows firms
to pass along the cost of regulator-approved
investments to their customers as part of the
price charged for electricity. Consumers must
pay the full price of any poor investments their
regional utility may have made in plants with
high marginal production costs or excessive
fixed costs.
Marginal-cost pricing implies that generat-
ing facilities facing competition must price elec-
tricity at or above the cost of operating the plant
if they are to remain open. Pricing will not be
affected by the cost of previous investments,
which must be paid whether the plant operates
or not, since electric generating facilities cannot
as a rule be used for other purposes (Scott,
Berger, and Thompson [1997]). Under this
approach, if a power plant with a high marginal
cost exits the market, consumers will not have
to pay for their utility’s earlier poor investment
decisions. Prices will decline and efficiency will
rise as a result. Further, as in most industries,
owners of (or investors in) electric generating
facilities that have high marginal costs or that
cannot fund their sunk capital costs out of
operating profits will see their value drop
(Maloney and McCormick [1996]).
Consumer choice and competition will also
lead to better investments and lower costs in
the future. With no way to pass the cost of poor
investments on to consumers, power generators
will have a greater incentive to invest only in
the most efficient plants. Prices need be just
high enough to cover the low operating costs
of these plants and a market rate of return on
future capital investment.3
Beyond investment issues, a movement
toward consumer choice and competition and
away from fair-rate-of-return pricing should
yield further efficiency gains and consequently
lower prices. Competitive forces will encourage
electricity generators to redouble cost-cutting
efforts by operating their plants more efficiently
and extending the lives of plants where operat-
ing costs are already low (Scott, Berger, and
Thompson [1997]). Generators will also have an
incentive to reduce excessive overhead costs
such as redundant central-office staff (Maloney
and McCormick [1996]). Further, a movement
toward time-of-day pricing will encourage cus-
tomers to shift consumption to lower-cost, off-
peak periods, allowing capacity-utilization rates
to rise and average prices to fall (Maloney and
McCormick [1996]).
The changes just mentioned point to a
substantial decline in long-term energy prices
across the nation. But how quickly can the
electric power generating industry make all
these adjustments in a newly competitive
environment? Near-term price declines will
depend on how quickly electric power genera-
tors cut operating and overhead costs and how
readily consumers shift their consumption to
off-peak hours.
  2 See http://www.naruc.org/Congressional/restructuringmatrix.htm
for a description of this legislation.
  3 Under competition, the number of poor investments should
decline, allowing capital to be invested in electric generating facilities with a
risk premium similar to that of other investments. This risk premium would
be far less than the cost of paying for poor investments under the regulated,
fair-rate-of-return price system.
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Another factor affecting the near-term drop
in electricity prices is the provision, already
discussed briefly in section I, for stranded-cost
recovery. This provision is designed to let utilities
recover some or all of the losses incurred by
generating facilities that become unprofitable
or less profitable after the price declines that
accompany deregulation. These would include
facilities that cannot show operating profits at
the new, unregulated market price or whose
profits are too low to maintain the book value
of their generating assets, so that the assets’
value is lower than it was before deregulation
(Scott, Berger, and Thompson [1997]). Ohio’s
legislation provides for a five-year period during
which energy distribution companies (and con-
sequently consumers) will pay an electricity-
use surcharge that will raise funds to fully (or 
at least partially) compensate local utilities for
losses associated with the transition to a dereg-
ulated environment. Naturally, the size of
short-run price declines will be influenced by
the extent to which this surcharge offsets utilities’
losses. Because stranded-cost recovery is limited
to a five-year transition period, it should not





The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Infor-
mation Administration (1997), Scott, Berger,
and Thompson (1997) of the University of
Kentucky, and Maloney and McCormick (1996)
for the Citizens for a Sound Economy Founda-
tion have estimated the price declines that
could result from deregulating electric utilities
throughout the United States and particularly in
the Midwest. These studies all show that com-
petition will lower electric power prices sub-
stantially in the long term, but they differ as to
the extent of near-term price declines. (The
studies typically use “near-term” to describe
price declines that are possible while existing
generating facilities remain in use, so that no
new capacity is assumed.)
The Energy Information Administration
(1997) predicted that in the short run, electric
power prices could fall to between 5.0 cents
and 5.3 cents per kWh in the East Central Area
Reliability Coordination Agreement region (the
ECAR region), which includes Ohio and the
entire Fourth Federal Reserve District. These
prices represent a drop of between 1.0 cent
and 1.3 cents per kWh in Ohio relative to the
state’s 1996 average of 6.3 cents per kWh
(Energy Information Administration [1999]).
The decline reflects lower labor costs in admin-
istration, operation, and maintenance, as well
as more efficient machinery. It also reflects the
introduction under competition of fuller time-
of-day pricing policies, which would increase
off-peak capacity utilization as demand shifts
toward off-peak hours. The shift would allow 
a larger share of electricity to be sold at lower,
off-peak prices, thus cutting the average price.
Maloney and McCormick (1996) estimate the
national price decline that would occur as com-
petition substantially expands time-of-day and
month-of-year pricing and increases off-peak
capacity utilization, predicting a drop of 0.9
cent to 1.8 cents per kWh. Scott, Berger, and
Thompson (1997) examine price changes in a
20-state area that includes the ECAR region as
well as some southern states.4 Their report
assumes greater efficiency in maintenance,
operation, and other production costs as
well as higher capacity utilization. Under this
model, electricity prices in Ohio would be
expected to fall 2.2 cents per kWh (from 6.3
cents to 4.1 cents), based on the expected
regional price and the current Ohio price. All
these cuts assume that no surcharge is added to
electricity prices to fund stranded-cost recovery.
With a surcharge, the near-term price declines
discussed above could be smaller, perhaps sub-
stantially so. These price declines are assumed
to apply to all groups of customers, including
residential, commercial, and industrial.5
  4 The states studied were Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
  5 Some have argued that the decline in energy prices will not be 
the same for all three major classes of customers: industrial, commercial,
and residential. There is a belief in the industry that industrial customers
currently subsidize residential ones. However, it is uncertain that this would
occur with deregulation given that large industrial customers’ location
choice is often based partly on electric power costs in the service area,
while this is not a major issue in residential location. As a consequence,
industrial customers may already be in a much better position to negotiate
lower costs for themselves, even in the current regulated pricing environ-
ment. A potentially more compelling explanation of why residential power
costs may fall less is that residential customers may be less able to shift
their consumption to off-peak hours. Regardless, Maloney and McCormick
(1996) still favor an expectation that the price decline (in absolute, rather
than percentage, terms) will be the same for industrial, commercial, and
residential customers.   
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Consumers will be the ultimate beneficiaries
of heightened competition, greater efficiency,
and declining costs in the electric power gener-
ation industry, but it is difficult to predict how
much they will save. They should benefit from
lower electric power costs both directly (in
their household electric bills) and indirectly
(because prices for most goods and services
will fall as the electric-power component of
business costs shrinks). Further, these savings
should grow over time as consumers and busi-
nesses adjust their consumption behavior to a
lower-energy-cost regime. In particular, con-
sumers who buy cheaper, less energy-efficient
heating systems and appliances will realize
greater savings.6 Businesses that purchase
cheaper, less energy-efficient equipment, heat-
ing, and lighting will be able to produce goods
more cheaply or operate a store or office at a
lower cost. These savings will eventually be
passed on to consumers as additional price cuts
in the full range of goods and services.
The difficulty stems from not knowing how
much producers and consumers will alter their
consumption behavior and equipment pur-
chases in an environment with lower electricity
prices. However, one approach to estimating
near-term savings from energy price reduc-
tions is to look at savings given existing con-
sumption behavior by households and
businesses. This would provide a snapshot of
the decline in the price of goods and services
due to falling electric costs, but avoid trying to
model consumer and technological responses
fully. The resulting near-term savings estimate
would probably be lower than the long-term
savings estimate.
A first-cut measure of the decline in the
price of goods and services resulting from
lower electricity prices can be made using
the Benchmark Input–Output Accounts of the
United States (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis [1994]).7 This
matrix shows each industry’s output and where
it accrues in terms of intermediate product pur-
chases and payments to factors of production
like labor, benefits, capital consumption, and
profits. In this sense, an industry’s measured
output is broken down into production costs,
assuming that profits are viewed simply as the
cost of the capital investment in the industry.
Thus, the matrix can be used to calculate what
share of each industry’s production costs goes
to purchase electricity. This information makes
it possible to estimate how much a given
energy price cut would lower an industry’s
overall production costs in the near term,
according to the following simple formula:
(1) Percent change (production costs) = 
Percent change (electricity price)*elec-
tricity’s share of total production costs.
If competition forces businesses to pass
along the entire drop in production costs to the
consumer in the form of lower prices, then the
percent change in production costs can be used
to calculate the percent change in price for
each industry.
We calculate the impact of electric-power-
price declines under three alternative scenarios
because of the uncertainty, already discussed,
as to how much near-term electricity prices will
drop when consumer choice and competition
are introduced. The low price decline modeled
will be a near-term drop of 0.9 cents per kWh,
which was the lower-bound estimate in the
reports of both the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Energy Information Administration (1997) and
Maloney and McCormick (1996). The middle
price decline will be a near-term drop of 1.8 cents
per kWh, which was the upper-bound estimate
from Maloney and McCormick (1996). The high
price decline modeled will be a near-term drop
of 2.2 cents per kWh, which was the estimate
given by Scott, Berger, and Thompson (1997).
Recall that these estimates all assume that no
surcharge per kWh of electric power is
imposed for stranded-cost recovery.
Household Electricity
Prices
Lower electricity prices will affect consumers
most directly in residential power prices, which
will decline substantially in percentage terms.
As of 1996, the average price of residential
power in Ohio was 8.6 cents per kWh. From
that level, a decline of 0.9 cent per kWh
  6 The price declines above already reflect consumer responses to
off-peak power consumption.
  7 This approach naturally assumes that U.S. average shares for
electricity are the same as Ohio companies’ share.
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would lead to a 10.5 percent decline in the price
of residential power. A decline of 1.8 cents
per kWh would lower the price 20.9 percent;
and a drop of 2.2 cents per kWh would trans-
late to a decline of 25.6 percent.
Prices of Other
Goods
The price decline in other goods and services
that utilize electric power will be more modest.
Following equation (1), this decline equals the
percent change in the price of electric power,
multiplied by electric power’s share of total
production costs. Electricity’s share of produc-
tion costs in each industry was estimated using
the Benchmark Input–Output Accounts of the
United States, as described above. The percent
change in the price of electric power varies by
industry. The decline will be much greater for
industrial customers, mostly in the mining and
manufacturing industries, who paid an average
price of 4.21 cents per kWh in 1996, compared
to commercial customers, who paid an average
price of 7.71 cents that year.
Average production-cost savings for each
industry were calculated using equation (1).
An average saving for all goods and services
was estimated by calculating a weighted aver-
age decline in production costs, with each
industry’s share of total U.S. output serving as
the weight.8 Taking this approach, a decline of
0.9 cents per kWh in the price of electric power
would translate into a 0.19 percent drop in the
price of goods and services. A price cut of
1.8 cents per kWh would lead to a 0.39 percent
decline in goods and services prices, while a
2.2 cents per kWh decline in electric power
costs would lower prices 0.47 percent.
The modest nature of these declines shows
that even such a key commodity as electric
power has a limited effect on overall price
levels. In the scenario featuring the largest
price decline (2.2 cents per kWh), the aggregate
impact on goods and services prices overall
was estimated to be a .47 percent decline,
which is slight compared to the typical annual
inflation rate of 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent. This
suggests that changes in the price of electric
energy may not have a large effect on changes
in the price level as a whole.
Overall Consumer
Savings
From the viewpoint of individual households,
however, the impact of energy price declines 
is substantial. Households will save in two
ways: through lower costs for household elec-
tricity use and through lower costs on other
goods and services. A large share of those
savings will occur directly in household electric
utility bills (see table 1). As indicated earlier,
a price decline of 0.9 cents per kWh would
amount to a 10.5 percent drop. Assuming
constant consumption, this would mean a
monthly reduction of $7.42 in electric power
bills and an annual reduction of $89.02.
Estimated savings would increase under more
optimistic assumptions regarding near-term
price declines. A decline of 1.8 cents per kWh
would translate into a $14.88 decline in the
average monthly bill (under constant con-
sumption) and an annual saving of $178.52. A
decline of 2.2 cents per kWh would result in
savings of $18.19 monthly and $218.29
annually. Naturally, actual household
energy bills would not decline this much,
since some households would choose to con-
sume more electric power if prices went down.
Still, constant-consumption estimates provide
a good measure of what households would
save on their current expenditures. Again, each
estimate assumes that consumers are not subject
to extra charges on their utility bills for funding
stranded-cost recovery.
  8 The average reduction is weighted according to total output in
each industry rather than each industry or good’s share of the market 
basket in the Consumer Price Index.
Average Household Savings in Residential
Electric Power Bills under Consumer Choice
(assuming constant consumption)
TABLE 1
Electric power Estimated price decline for Savings on electric power bill
price-decline scenario residential customers (percent) Per month Per year
0.9 cent per kWh 10.5 $ 7.42 $ 89.02
1.8 cents per kWh 20.9 $14.88 $178.52
2.2 cents per kWh 25.6 $18.19 $218.29
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration (1998).
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Lower electric power costs would also mean
savings on existing household purchases. The
savings can be calculated from the typical
household’s spending on goods and services
and the average electricity price declines esti-
mated above, which range from 0.19 percent
to 0.47 percent, depending on the price-
decline scenario. U.S. households’ average
annual expenditures minus pension and Social
Security contributions, cash contributions, and
electricity purchases came to $29,244 in 1996
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics [1998]). As table 2 shows, a 0.19 per-
cent decline in the average price of goods and
services would produce estimated annual sav-
ings of $55.56 in current expenditures. This is
the savings in goods and services purchases
that would result from a decline of 0.9 cents
per kWh. With a decline 1.8 cents per kWh,
the estimated annual savings would be $114.05.
A decline of 2.2 cents per kWh would mean
estimated savings of $137.45 annually. Note
that these are savings on existing purchases
only, and that consumers are likely to expand
their buying in response to lower prices.
When savings on other goods and ser-
vices are added to those on residential electric
power, total annual savings range from about
$140 to $350 per household under alternative
scenarios. Direct savings on power purchases
typically account for about 60 percent of
households’ total savings, while the other
40 percent results from price reductions in
other goods and services. This contradicts the
argument that price reductions resulting from
electricity deregulation will accrue only to
commercial and industrial customers, not to
individual households. Even if this were so,
consumers would continue to gain from
deregulation as businesses’ electricity savings
were passed on in the form of lower costs for




Estimating the effects of deregulation requires
important assumptions at each step. Although
the direct impacts on electricity prices are rela-
tively straightforward to predict, they offer a
range of alternatives. Evaluating electricity’s
effects on other prices requires the additional
assumption that the economy’s production and
consumption patterns will not change if elec-
tricity prices drop.
Analysis under these assumptions indicates
that the decline in the general price level
resulting from the anticipated fall in energy
prices would be small (but still meaningful)
compared to annual inflation rates. This sug-
gests a limited effect on the overall price level.
However, because the assumptions are restric-
tive, applying an alternative estimator (with its
own assumptions) is warranted. Moreover, the
analysis above does not allow for multiplier
effects or anticipate how various market parti-
cipants will react to reductions in the price of a
general factor of production, nor does it con-
sider the actions of the monetary authority.
The analysis is best suited to providing a base-
line for the price-level effects of the cost sav-
ings associated with electricity deregulation.
An alternative empirical analysis can utilize
the fact that energy prices have a history of
sharp changes. Several past occasions when
sudden movements in energy prices were not
quickly reversed should parallel the impacts of
deregulation. Figure 1, which compares the
annual rate of change in the energy component
of the Consumer Price Index with the CPI as a
whole, shows that energy prices have swung
widely over the last 28 years.
Recent history contains four distinct episodes
of sudden price movements. In 1973, an oil
shock caused energy prices to rise very sharply
at times (as much as 33 percent from the
previous year) and then stabilize around a
substantial rate of increase that typically
exceeded the overall inflation rate. A second
oil shock hit in 1979 and lasted about two
years, boosting prices sharply. In its wake, the
energy component of the CPI fluctuated
around zero change, making this an interesting
Average Household Savings in Other Goods
and Services Purchases under Consumer
Choice (assuming constant consumption)
TABLE 2
1996
Electric power Estimated price decline for Current Estimated
price-decline scenario other goods and services (percent) expenditures savings
0.9 cent per kWh 0.19 $29,244 $ 55.56
1.8 cents per kWh 0.39 $29,244 $114.05
2.2 cents per kWh 0.47 $29,244 $137.45
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1996).
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case of a one-time price shock. In 1986, energy
prices suddenly declined, only partially recov-
ering during a brief bounce-back in 1987.
Energy prices quickly rose and fell again in
response to the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990.
None of these episodes, however, originated
in or focused on electricity; in every case, oil
prices were the driving factor.
Are the prices of energy from other sources
suitable for evaluating electricity deregulation’s
effects on the general price level? This issue
can be separated into three more easily answered
questions: 1) How big a price shock will elec-
tricity deregulation produce? 2) When utilities
are deregulated, will other goods’ prices react
as they did to oil shocks? 3) Will changes in
electricity prices be reflected in other energy
prices? Answers to these questions are neces-
sary to establish an a priori case for the tests
used in this article and may limit our results’
applicability. 
Fortunately, the first question is the
focus of the existing microeconomic analysis.
We have three values to work with: 10.5 per-
cent, 20.9 percent, and 25.6 percent. Oil shocks
exceeded these values in the 1970s; in later epi-
sodes, the shocks were similar in size to these.
As to the second question, electricity prices
represent 2.7 percent of the CPI based on
households’ average direct consumption; oil
and motor fuels represent 3.2 percent. Of
course, oil or electricity prices may be reflected
in other goods and services according to the
energy consumption of producers and even
retailers. For these purposes, direct or indirect
energy use is a better measure because house-
holds consume about two-thirds of gross
domestic production. This more complete
accounting shows that a substantial change in
the price of electricity could be as significant as
an oil shock.
Finally, other energy prices responded to oil
prices because some users were able to substi-
tute away from oil toward other sources. Many
users, however, are limited to consuming a
particular form of energy. After the first oil
shock, petroleum products’ share of U.S.
energy consumption fell only slightly, from
46.9 percent in 1973 to 46.1 percent in 1974
and 46.4 percent in 1975. Consumers’ ability to
switch to electricity is difficult to measure,
although there is certainly room for residential
and some industrial substitution. Nonetheless,
prices for other energy sources seem unlikely




The first step in our econometric approach is
to assess energy prices’ effect on the inflation
rate (both the overall rate and the core mea-
sures, on which energy prices have a smaller
direct impact) by testing whether a change in
energy prices imparts any information on the
future inflation rate. This procedure, commonly
called the Granger test of causality, provides a
flexible evaluation of whether a statistical rela-
tionship exists, but may not represent clearly
the process that links the variables being
studied. The Federal Reserve’s response,
which could counteract energy shocks, is not
specifically estimated. Several articles have
explored this issue, but determining whether
monetary policy reacts to energy prices requires
specific assumptions and a more sophisticated
model. Instead, this paper seeks evidence of
energy price effects by including relative price
effects because, even if the Federal Reserve
chose to counteract shifts in the general price
level, it would leave relative price shifts altered.
Monetary policy applies to all prices equally.
FIGURE 1
Consumer Price Index
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CPI energy component
CPI, all items
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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A critical element in the Granger test is the
number of lags—including periods of older
data—used to forecast the inflation rate. The
same period of lagged information from both
the predetermined inflation data and energy
prices is used to provide two simulated fore-
casts of the current inflation rate. There are
limited a priori grounds for believing that 
information is only relevant for a given length
of time. On the other hand, there is little reason
to consider the inflation increment from two
years ago useful information, once last year’s
data have been included. In this paper, we
report tests based on three, six, 12, and 24
months of lags. We include the shorter period
because energy prices might have an immedi-
ate impact that is quickly incorporated into the
overall inflation measure. Twelve months of
lags allow for a fairly accurate prediction of
monthly inflation increments, yet still permit
additional information to play a role. Increas-
ing the length of lags from three to 24 months
raises the explanatory power of the regression.
For example, the R2 rises from 0.52 to 0.60 in
regressions on inflation spanning 1957–99. The
higher R2 at the longer lag horizon implies that
the regression yields predictions that mimic
inflation trend movements over the period.
The first test is to see if energy prices are
statistically useful in predicting the general
inflation rate. Table 3 shows the results of
these tests for three to 24 monthly lags. Begin-
ning with the full period (1957–99), adding
energy prices in the predictive equation did
not significantly improve those predictions (in
a statistical sense), except for a moderate influ-
ence at 24 lags. The probability values shown
for the hypothesis that there was no predictive
information in the energy component can be
rejected at the 90 percent confidence level
(when the probability value is less than 10 per-
cent). This methodology is quite flexible in that
it does not presuppose a structure of energy
prices affecting inflation, but it does require
that the effects be consistent throughout the
estimation period. Given the distinct types of
energy shocks and a potential break in mone-
tary policy, this limitation may be excessive.
Focusing on three subperiods allow us to
consider specific scenarios without constrain-
ing the parameters to be identical in another
scenario. The time is divided roughly accord-
ing to decade: 1970–80, 1980–90, and 1988–99.
The first period has a generally accelerating
inflation rate combined with rapid, sustained
energy price increases. The second has declin-
ing inflation rates and the steep 1986 fall in
energy prices, which recovered only partially
in later years. The last 10 years combine a
more stable (but typically declining) inflation
rate and the Gulf War oil shock, which was
fully reversed.
Each of these periods contains evidence that
energy played a role in inflation trends beyond
the information included in the inflation rate
history. The lower rows of table 3 show the
results of Granger causality tests in the sub-
periods.  The timing of the estimated effects of
the energy component varies between periods;
1970–80 shows the strongest association at a
full year; for the 1980–90 period, the effects
are only evident at three months. In the last
10 years, the relationship has been particularly
clear. Because this period includes a rapid fall
in the price of energy as well as stability in the
conduct of monetary policy, it may be the
most appropriate for investigating electricity
deregulation. It is remarkable as a period when
energy price changes affected the CPI. It doesn’t
matter how many lagged values are included
in the 1990s, but the different results for earlier
periods suggest considering both three-month
and 12-month lags in the more detailed 
estimations.
Granger Causality Tests on the Overall 
Inflation Rate
TABLE 3
Number of monthly lags
3 6 12 24
1957–99 No No No Maybe (6.5%)
1970–80 No Yes (2.4%) Yes (1.4%) No
1980–90 Yes (4.7%) No No No
1988–99 Yes (0.2%) Yes (0.0%) Yes (0.4%) Yes (3.6%)
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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While energy prices may affect the prices
of other products, this need not happen. One
obvious distinction among episodes of energy
price shocks is the stance of monetary policy.9
The 1970s have been described as a decade
in which U.S. monetary policy was unduly
expansionary when challenged by oil shocks.
Under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker, who
was appointed in November 1979, monetary
policy shifted, making disinflation its primary
goal. An alternative possible explanation is
that, without concern for the stance of mone-
tary policy, energy prices don’t feed through
to enough other prices to matter (or at least
to be identified using Granger causality tests).
If this is the case, energy prices should not
alter the CPI’s subcomponents. Monetary pol-
icy cannot isolate specific components of the
CPI from energy shocks, which are likely to
have differential impacts on industries (based
on their energy dependence) that would yield
relative price responses.
Tables 4 and 5 apply the same techniques
to major subcomponents of the price index,
including or excluding energy where relevant.
Table 4 shows the tests based on 12 months of
lagged values, while table 5 shows three-month
tests. The time period is again split into three
separately estimated episodes. Both tables
show a clear pattern:10 In the 1970s, energy
price changes fed into most major CPI compo-
nents, even those that did not include energy
directly. Indeed, the independent role of energy
is rejected only in components that did include
energy directly, possibly because energy is
already too well reflected in the CPI compo-
nent for energy prices on their own to add
information. Since 1980, by contrast, there has
been little evidence that energy prices altered
components that exclude energy prices.
While we cannot rule out differences in
either the nature of energy shocks or the rela-
tionship between prices, the likely explanation
for these findings is a shift in monetary policy’s
response to energy shocks. The prices of energy
relative to other goods adjust after 1980, but
the relative energy price shock does not trans-
late into inflation in other goods. This suggests
that while deregulation of electricity prices
would undoubtedly benefit consumers, it
might have less effect on the overall inflation
rate than the microeconomic analysis would
indicate. Nonetheless, the consumer benefits
shown in the microeconomic analysis are at
least partially confirmed by the macroeconomic
analysis because relative price shifts are
identified and represent the source of con-
sumer gains when an independent monetary
authority can alter the price level.
  9 Identifying the reaction of monetary policy to energy shocks has
been an active area of research. The present paper focuses more narrowly
than this literature, which attempts to address the issue of whether mone-
tary policy or energy shocks are associated with recessions, when the
stance of monetary policy may depend on energy shocks. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Watson (1997) conclude that “an important part of the effects
of oil price shocks on the economy results not from the change in oil
prices, per se, but from the resulting tightening of monetary policy.”
Brown and Yücel (1999) find that monetary policy was neutral in response
to oil shocks, if neutrality is defined in terms of stable nominal GDP
growth. In either case, monetary policy is important (if difficult to identify)
in the macroeconomic response to oil shocks.
  10 Both tables are presented to demonstrate that these conclu-
sions are not sensitive to the lag lengths used in the tests.
Granger Causality Tests on CPI 
Subcomponents, 12 Lags
TABLE 4
1957–99 1970–80 1980–90 1988–99
All items, mean No Yes (1.4%) No Yes (0.4%)
All items except Yes (3.1%) No No No
energy
All items except Yes (0.0%) Yes (0.1%) No No
food and energy
All items, Yes (0.5%) Yes (0.5%) No No
median
Commodities Yes (1.0%) No Maybe (5.8%) Yes (0.4%)
Commodities Yes (0.2%) Yes (0.2%) No No
except food
and energy
Durable Yes (0.1%) Yes (0.2%) No No
commodities
Nondurable Yes (0.0%) No Yes (0.3%) Yes (0.0%)
commodities
Services Yes (0.0%) Maybe (7.8%) No No
Services except Yes (0.8%) Yes (2.0%) No No
energy
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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VI. Conclusion
Deregulated electricity generation can be
expected to offer consumers many advantages,
including dramatically lower energy costs.
Electricity prices are interesting from a macro-
economic viewpoint because electricity is a
major component of consumers’ budgets
(and thus of the CPI) and a large factor of
production for many companies. This raises
the possibility that electricity deregulation
could create a substantial shock to the overall
price trend, comparable to energy shocks in
recent history.
Another key factor, on which this paper
does not focus directly, is the price-setting
environment. The Federal Reserve’s behavior
was probably a key factor in past episodes
when energy prices moved dramatically.
Historical accounts of the 1970s describe a
Federal Reserve policy that attempted to
smooth U.S. output in the face of oil shocks
instead of focusing on inflation. In later periods
our estimates, which show no feed-through
from energy prices to inflation, may reflect the
important shift of U.S. monetary policy after
1980. If policy follows roughly the course of
the last 15 years, then electricity deregulation’s
effect on inflation (as measured by the CPI)
is likely to be primarily a direct one. Some
important relative shifts remain largely hidden
by monetary policy, but are no less relevant.
The benefits to consumers and producers
identified in the microeconomic analyses
strongly support legislative efforts to increase
competition in one of the last bastions of
regulated profits.
Granger Causality Tests on CPI 
Subcomponents, Three Lags
TABLE 5
1957–99 1970–80 1980–90 1988–99
All items, mean No No Yes (4.7%) Yes (0.3%)
All items except No Maybe (6.0%) No No
energy
All items except Yes (0.9%) Yes (0.3%) No No
food and energy
All items, Yes (7.6%) No No No
median
Commodities Yes (0.7%) No No Yes (1.0%)
Commodities Yes (1.7%) Yes (0.7%) No No
except food
and energy
Durable Yes (1.8%) Yes (1.3%) No No
commodities
Nondurable Yes (1.9%) No No No
commodities
Services Yes (4.6%) Yes (2.4%) No No
Services except Maybe (7.5%) Yes (0.2%) No No
energy
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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